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Implicative Predicates
Abstract
Subjects were timed while they drew inferences from syntactically
affirmative and negative sentences containing the semantically positive and
negative implicative predicates remember/forget and bother/neglect, under
different linguistic contexts that met the presuppositions of the sentences
at varying levels of generality. Different patterns of inference latencies
were obtained for the two implicative predicates studied, suggesting that
there are important differences among semantically negative implicative
predicates that influence their representation and processing. Regardless
of these differences, inference latencies for all sentences decreased when
they were presented in contexts that met some of their presuppositions
indicating that context can facilitate inferential processing.
Drawing Inferences from Semantically Positive and
Negative Implicative Predicates
The present paper reports an experiment designed to investigate the
inferential processing involved in the comprehension of a class of complex
predicates (such as, "remember to," "manage to," "fail to," "neglect to")
which are known as "implicative." Karttunen (1971) has argued that there
is an implication between a main sentence with an implicative predicate and
the proposition contained in it as complement. For example, the assertion
of (1) commits the speaker/hearer of English to the view that (2) is true.
(1) John managed to solve the problem.
(2) John solved the problem.
In addition to this logical component, a negative component is also
involved in the semantic characterization of a subcategory of implicative
predicates whose assertion commits the speaker/hearer of the language to
the falsity of the proposition contained in their complements. For
example, both sentences (3) and (4) commit the speaker/hearer of the
language to the view that (5) is true.
(3) John failed to solve the problem.
(4) John didn't manage to solve the problem.
(5) John didn't solve the problem.
Although both (3) and (4) have the same truth value, sentence (3) does
not meet Klima's (1964) criteria of syntactic negation. Implicative
predicates which imply the falsity of the proposition contained in their
complements are known as "inherently negative" or "semantically negative"
(Clark, 1974; Just & Carpenter, 1971).
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The logical and negative components included in the semantic
characterization of implicative predicates make them particularly
interesting for investigation. How do people draw inferences from
sentences containing implicative predicates? Is the inferential process
affected by the different kinds of negation? Given that semantically
positive and negative implicative predicates carry opposite implications,
is this information represented in the mental lexicon, and if so, how? How
does the linguistic context in which sentences with implicative predicates
occur influence the inferential process?
Some of these questions have been addressed by Just and Clark (1973)
in two experiments investigating the effects of semantic negation on the
verification of probes derived from the implications and presuppositions of
implicative sentences. The results of these experiments indicated that, in
many respects, semantic negation functions like syntactic negation.
Namely, when subjects were asked to assess the truth or falsity of probes
derived from the implications of implicative sentences, longer verification
latencies were obtained for semantically negative (hereafter SEM-NEG) than
for semantically positive and syntactically affirmative (hereafter AFF)
sentences. Moreover, while true negatives took longer to verify than false
negatives, true positive sentences had shorter verification latencies than
false positive sentences (at least for one of the two semantically
positive/negative implicative predicate pairs they studied).
This true-false/affirmative-negative interaction, which has usually
been obtained in the case of syntactic negation (e.g., Clark & Chase, 1972;
Gough, 1965; Trabasso, 1972), has been interpreted as indicating that
sentences with semantically negative lexical items (including implicative
predicates) are represented like syntactically negative sentences; i.e., in
terms of an affirmative core and a negative polarity marker (Carpenter &
Just, 1975; Clark, 1974; Clark, Note 1).
The purpose of the present experiment was to carry out a deeper
investigation of the process of drawing inferences from sentences with
implicative predicates under conditions of both semantic
positiveness/negativeness and syntactic affirmation/negation. Some
exemplar affirmative and negative sentences with semantically positive and
Insert Table 1 about here.
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negative implicative predicates are presented in Table 1.
One question of interest was whether the inferential process for
semantic negation would be different from the process for syntactic
negation. This question is of interest because, unlike AFF and SEM-NEG
implicative predicates, SYN-NEG and SEM-NEG predicates do not differ in
their implications; both imply the falsity of the proposition contained in
their complements, and thus both involve a negative component. In
comparing the possible inferential processes involved in the comprehension
of AFF and SEM-NEG implicative predicates, one should expect longer
inference latencies for SEM-NEG than AFF sentences because only the former
involve a negative component. It is not clear, however, whether one should
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expect any differences in the inferential processing of SEM-NEG and SYN-NEG
sentences since they both involve a negative component. The only
difference between SEM-NEG and SYN-NEG sentences is in their "scope."
The "scope of negation" hypothesis was originally proposed by Klima
(1964) who argued that syntactic negation has a larger scope than semantic
negation because it applies to the whole sentence, while semantic negation
applies only to certain of the subordinate constituents of the sentence.
Following a similar vein, Clark (1974) has argued that syntactic negation
has a larger scope than semantic negation because it negates both the
assertions and the "suppositions" of a sentence. Clark (1974) defines
suppositions as temporary assumptions that speakers and listeners usually
make when they use (in this case) negative sentences. For example, the
sentence "John didn't remember to come" is used to deny the positive
supposition that John was supposed to come. In this case negation applies
both to the assertion and the supposition of the sentence (It was false to
suppose that John would come). Semantic negation, however, is used to
affirm negative suppositions. For example, the sentence, "John forgot to
come" is used to affirm the negative supposition that John was not supposed
to come. In this case negation does not apply to the assertions of the
sentence but only to its suppositions (It was true to suppose that John
would not come).
Suppositions are closely related but not identical to
"presuppositions" as identified by Austin (1972), Fillmore (1971) or Lakoff
(1971). The reason is that different criteria have to be applied to
determine whether part of the meaning of a sentence is a presuppposition or
a supposition.
In previous investigations of syntactic and semantic negation (not
involving inferential processing), shorter latencies have been obtained for
SEM-NEG than SYN-NEG sentences when the two types of negation are compared
in the same task (Carpenter & Just, 1971; Clark, 1974; Jones, 1968). Clark
(1974) has attributed the difference in the latencies of the two negation
types to differences in their scope. In order to account for such
differences within their information processing models of negation, both
Clark (1974) and Carpenter and Just (1975) have proposed that information
about the presuppositional (or suppositional) nature of negative sentences
should be part of their proposed representations, otherwise consisting of
an affirmative core and a negative polarity marker.
In view of the general agreement among psychologists, and also
linguists (Chomsky, 1971; Lakoff, 1971), that the presuppositions of a
sentence are an important aspect of its meaning, the following questions
were raised in this study. First, would such assumed differences in the
presuppositions of negative sentences influence the process of drawing
implications from SEM-NEG and SYN-NEG implicative predicates? And if so,
would the obtained results support the present proposals regarding the
representations of semantically and syntactically negative sentences?
A second related question centered around the possible effect that a
linguistic context meeting the presuppositions of sentences with
implicative predicates can have on the inferential process. It has been
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shown that comprehension is facilitated when sentences occur in contexts
that meet their presuppositions than in contexts which do not (Haviland &
Clark, 1974; Olson & Filby, 1972; Wason, 1965, 1972; Wason & Johnson-Laird,
1972). For example Wason (1965) has argued that the function of syntactic
negation is to deny a positive presupposition, and has shown that much of
the difficulty subjects have with syntactically negative sentences
disappears when these sentences are presented in contexts that meet these
presuppositions.
In this experiment, the inferential processing of implicative
sentences was investigated both in isolation from context and under
different linguistic contexts meeting the presuppositions of the sentences
at different levels of generality. The psychological question related to
context was whether the linguistic contexts meeting the presuppositions of
the negative implicative sentences would facilitate the task of drawing the
implications of these sentences.
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 64 adults, undergraduate and graduate students at an
eastern university. They were paid $2.50 to participate in this
experiment.
Materials and Procedure
The experiment was an inference-drawing task. Subjects were timed
while they read and answered sentence triads consisting of a context
sentence, a target sentence, and a probe, presented one at a time.
All sentences were presented visually on the oscilloscope screen of a
PDP-12 computer. Each trial was initiated by the word READY, which
appeared on the screen of the computer for 100 msec. 1500 msec after the
offset of this signal, a context sentence appeared in the center of the
screen for 2000 msec. Immediately after its offset, a target sentence
appeared and remained in the screen for 1500 msec. Immediately after the
offset of the target, a probe appeared on the screen and remained in view
until the subject responded. The subjects were timed in milliseconds from
the appearance of the probe to the first push of the response button.
There was an interval of 2000 msec between trials.
A context sentence appeared on the screen of the computer first.
There were, in all, four context conditions: no context, an unbiased
context, a bad context, and a good context. The no-context condition
consisted of a broken line (------------) in the place of a context
sentence. Its function was to control for the possibility that the context
sentences acted as a preparatory signal for the appearance of the target
sentence and as such decreased response time.
The unbiased context was a simple affirmative sentence, of the form "X
has a y" (i.e., Fred has a safe). It was designed to meet some of the
general presuppositions of all the target sentences. For example, all
target sentences presupposed the existence of the object denoted by the
complement noun (i.e., that Fred had a safe). The unbiased sentence met
this general presupposition of all context sentences. In addition, it
acted as a control for the presentation of the complement noun of the
target sentence in the other context sentences.
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The bad context was a sentence of the form "X is usually bad about
taking care of y" (i.e., Fred is usually bad about taking care of the
safe). It was assumed that this negative context sentence would create a
negative supposition and thus facilitate the processing of semantically
negative target sentences. The good context had the form "X is usually
good about taking care of the y" and was assumed to facilitate the
processing of semantically positive target sentences.
After the offset of the context sentence, a target sentence appeared
in the screen of the computer. The target sentences were simple
declarative sentences of the form "X has(n't) "implicative verb" to
"complement'," (i.e., Fred has(n't) remembered to open the safe). The
target sentences differed in semantics, in syntax and in their truth value
as indicated in Table 1.
There were two implicative verb sets, each consisting of one
semantically positive and one semantically negative verb. The implicative
verbs were, remember/forget and bother/neglect. In addition, there were
four complement types, each consisting of two sentences differing only in
their complement verbs. These complement verbs were binary in the sense
that, within the context of the sentences used, the negation of one implied
the affirmation of the other. The complement sentences used were the
following: to load the rifle/to empty the rifle, to open the safe/to close
the safe, to lock the door/to unlock the door, and to free the parrot/to
cage the parrot.
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Each target sentence was followed by a probe. Probes presented
subjects with the complement noun and the two complement verbs associated
with the preceding target sentence. For example, if the target sentence
stated that Today John has remembered to open the safe the probe consisted
of the word safe and the verbs opened and closed placed below it, one to
its right and the other to its left. The subjects were asked to draw the
implication of the target sentence and indicate their answer by pressing,
from two buttons located in front of them, the button corresponding to the
correct complement verb.
In addition to the context sentences, target sentences, and probes, 32
memory checks were also inserted randomly between experimental trials in
order to force subjects to read the context sentences. These memory checks
presented the subjects with a list of three context-target sentence
combinations and asked them to identify the context-target sentence pair
that had immediately preceded.
The design was a (2 x 2 x 2) x (4 x 4 x 2 x 2 x 2) factorial design.
The three between-subjects factors were counterbalanced for order of
presentation, complement verb (open/close), and right/left position of the
correct complement verb in the probes. The within subject factors were (a)
context (no context, unbiased, bad and good), (b) implicative verb type
(remember/forget and bother/neglect), (c) complement type (to load/empty
the rifle, to open/close the safe, to lock/unlock the door and to free/cage
the parrot), (d) syntactic affirmation/negation, and (e) semantic
positiveness/negativeness.
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The experiment started with a practice session of 32 trials identical
in form to the experimental trials but with different implicative
predicates. The test session consisted of 128 experimental trials
presented randomly for all subjects. The 128 experimental trials
represented all the possible combinations of the two implicative predicate
types under conditions of syntactic affirmation/negation and semantic
positivenes/negativeness, in combination with the four different
complements and under the four context conditions.
For each subject, erroneous responses were reinserted until correct
responses were obtained on all trials. Two subjects were dropped and
replaced because they made more than 10 errors. The practice and
experimental sessions lasted approximately 35 minutes.
Results
The No-Context Condition
An analysis of variance was first computed for the inference latencies
representing the no-context condition. Results indicated a main effect for
syntactic affirmation/negation, F(1,56) = 13.522, p < .001. This main
effect was due to longer inference latencies for syntactically negative
sentences (1301 msee) than for syntactically affirmative sentences (1125
msec). There was also a main effect for semantic
positiveness/negativeness, F(1,56) = 24.878, p < .001, a result of longer
inference latencies for sentences with semantically negative predicates
(1299 msec) than for sentences with semantically positive predicates (1128
msec).
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There was an interaction between implicative verb type, syntactic
affirmation/negation and semantic positiveness/negativeness, F(1,56) =
14.246, p < .001, which is presented in Figure 1. This interaction shows
that the relationship between the different types of negation is different
in the case of remember/forget than in the case of bother/neglect.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
In the case of remember/forget syntactic affirmation/negation
interacted with semantic positivenes/negativeness. As can be seen in
Figure 1 this interaction was due to the fact that semantically positive
implicative predicates had shorter inference latencies than semantically
negative implicative predicates only under conditions of syntactic
affirmation, not under conditions of syntactic negation. In other words,
sentences with remember (AFF sentences) had shorter inference latencies
than sentences with forget (SEM-NEG sentences), but sentences with not
remember (SYN-NEG sentences) had longer inference latencies than sentences
with not forget (SEM/SYN-NEG sentences). No such interaction between
syntactic affirmation/negation and semantic positiveness/negativeness was
obtained in the case of bother/neglect.
Planned comparisons were used to investigate further the interaction
between syntactic affirmation/negation and semantic
positiveness/negativeness for remember/forget; this interaction and was
found to be statistically significant, F(1,56) = 5.68, p < .05. The
Implicative PredicatesImplicative Predicates
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overall difference between the semantically negative forget and the
syntactically negative not remember was not, however, statistically
reliable.
A tentative account of this differential pattern of results for the
two predicate pairs will be given in the discussion.
Context Effects
An analysis of variance was then computed for the inference latencies
representing all 128 experimental trials, including context.
The main effect of context was statistically reliable, F(3,180) =
93.868, p < .001. The mean inference latencies for this main effect are
presented in Table 2. Using a planned comparison, the mean inference
latency for the no context condition was found to be significatly longer
than the mean inference latencies for each of the three context conditions,
F(1,180) = 7.98, p < .01. The three context conditions were not reliably
different from one another.
Insert Table 2 about here.
Context decreased inference latencies for sentences with semantically
negative implicative verbs more than for sentences with semantically
positive implicative verbs. The interaction between context and semantic
positiveness/negativeness was statistically significant, F(3,180) = 3.906,
p < .01. Overall, sentences with semantically negative implicative verbs
had significantly longer inference latencies than sentences with
semantically positive verbs only in the no context condition. In contrast,
syntactically negative sentences had significantly longer inference
latencies than syntactically affirmative sentences under all context
conditions. In other words, context did not facilitate all types of
sentences equally; it facilitated semantic negation more than syntactic
negation.
The context X syntactic affirmation/negation X semantic
positivenes/negativeness interaction was not statistically significant.
However, in view of the different pattern of inference latencies obtained
for the two implicative verb types, this interaction was examined
separately for remember/forget and bother/neglect using planned
comparisons. Figure 2 shows the mean inference latencies for the two
implicative verb types as a function of context, syntactic
Insert Figure 2 about here.
affirmation/negation, and semantic positiveness/negativeness. The planned
comparisons showed a significant interaction between context, syntactic
affirmation/negation, and semantic positiveness/negativenes, only in the
case of bother/neglect, F(1,180) = 7.22, p < .01. This interaction was due
to the fact that while the semantically negative sentences neglect and not
neglect had shorter inference latencies in the bad contexct condition as
compared to the unbiased and good context conditions, the semantically
positive sentences bother and not bother did not.
14
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Discussion
The obtained results indicated that, overall, inferential processing
was influenced by differences in the presuppositions of the implicative
predicates studied and by the linguistic context in which they occurred.
Although this general conclusion applies to both implicative verb types
studied, there were also important differences in the way the two
implicative verb types functioned in the present experiment both in the
absence of context and under the various linguistic contexts. In the
following pages, results involving the no-context condition will be
discussed first. Results involving the context conditions will be
discussed second.
The No-Context Condition
It will be argued that the obtained results support Clark's (1974) and
Carpenter and Just's (1975) hypothesis that semantically negative sentences
are represented in terms of an affirmative core and a negative polarity
marker in the case of forget, but not in the case of neglect. This
argument is based on the assumption that the interaction between syntactic
affirmation/negation and semantic positiveness/negativeness in the present
inference-drawing task is equivalent to the true/false-affirmative/negative
interaction obtained in verification experiments.
In a verification experiment, an affirmative or negative sentence is
posited against the presence or absence of a picture (or another sentence),
which makes it either true or false of the situation it describes. In the
present experiment, the truth or falsity of the situation is not
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manipulated, but the sentences examined have a truth value by virtue of the
logical aspects of the implicative predicates involved. While both AFF and
SEM-NEG sentences are syntactically affirmative, only AFF sentences have
positive implications. SEM-NEG sentences have negative implications. AFF
sentences can thus be characterized as true affirmatives (since they imply
the truth of the proposition contained in their complement), while SEM-NEG
sentences can be characterized as false affirmatives (since they imply the
falsity of that proposition). Similarly, while SYN-NEG and SEM/SYN-NEG
sentences are both syntactically negative, only SYN-NEG sentences have
negative implications; SEM/SYN-NEG sentences have positive implications.
SYN-NEG sentences can thus be characterized as true negatives (since they
imply the falsity of the proposition contained in their complement), and
SEM/SYN-NEG sentences as false negatives, (since they imply the truth of
that proposition).
If so, the obtained interaction between syntactic affirmation/negation
and semantic positiveness/negativeness in the case of remember/forget is
equivalent to the true/false-affirmative/negative interaction obtained in
verification experiments, thus supporting the hypothesis that sentences
with forget are represented in terms of an affirmative core and a negative
polarity marker, as discussed in Clark (1974) and Carpenter and Just
(1975).
With respect to the scope-of-negation hypothesis, SYN-NEG sentences
were found to have longer inference latencies than SEM-NEG sentences in the
case of remember/forget, although this difference was statistically
Implicative Predicates
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reliable only when the context conditions were also taken into
consideration. This finding agrees in general with the scope-of-negation
hypothesis and indicates that sentences which are logically equivalent but
whose negative components differ in scope function differently in an
inference-drawing task just they do in other language comprehension
experiments.
The pattern of inference latencies for bother/neglect was not
consistent with the scope-of-negation hypothesis nor with the hypothesis
that subjects represent semantically negative sentences as explicit
negations of their equivalent affirmatives, since no interaction between
syntactic affirmation/negation and semantic positiveness/negativeness was
obtained. The lack of such an interaction could be explained if we assume
that subjects treated neglect independently of bother. This is a very
plausible assumption if one takes into consideration the meaning relation
between bother and neglect, as compared to that between remember and
forget. Whereas not remember necessarily implies forget, and vice versa,
not bother does not necessarily imply neglect. As Karttunen (1971) notes,
neglect (like avoid), although a semantically negative predicate, differs
from forget in that it does not have a semantically positive predicate
which it completely negates.
If neglect is represented independently of bother, then neglect is a
very different kind of semantically negative predicate than forget. More
specifically, a distinction can be drawn between semantically negative
implicative predicates which deny a positive counterpart, such as forget
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and fail (hereafter SEM-NEGp), and semantically negative implicative
predicates which do not have such semantically positive counterparts to
deny, such as neglect and avoid (hereafter SEM-NEGn). SEM-NEGp lexical
items can be processed either as negations of their positive counterparts
or not. SEM-NEGn lexical items, however, cannot be processed as negations
of a positive core. Thus, the obtained results suggest that there are
important differences among semantically negative implicative predicates
that influence their comprehension.
The present results also suggest that the scope-of-negation hypothesis
applies to SEM-NEGn sentences but not to SEM-NEGp sentences, since only
SEM-NEG sentences with forget had shorter inference latencies than SYN-NEG
sentences with remember as predicted by the scope-of-negation hypthesis.
Another interesting finding was that syntactic negation time (the
difference of AFF from SYN-NEG sentences) was very short in the case of not
bother (98 msec) as compared to not remember (366 msec). It is possible
that the short negation time for not bother is related to the fact that not
bother is a very commonly used negative form. If so, this finding should
be restricted to not bother and a few verbs in the same category. Further
study of syntactic negation is required to determine this. Variability in
negation time is not, however, a phenomenon unique to this study.
Carpenter and Just (1975), in a comparison of negation times obtained in
studies of syntactic and semantic negation, have concluded that negation
time can vary from 200 to 600 msec even in the same study. Within the
framework of their "Constituent Comparison Model" for the processing of
Implicative Predicates Implicative Predicates
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negative sentences, Carpenter and Just (1975) have accounted for this
finding by proposing that negative sentences are sometimes represented in
terms of two embedded propositions and sometimes in terms of three embedded
propositions. These different representations are assumed to capture the
different suppositional nature of negative sentences.
Similarly, within the framework of the present study, the short
negation time for not bother could be accounted for if it is assumed that
representations for not bother consist of two embedded propositions and
that representations for not remember consist of three embedded
propositions (see the Carpenter & Just, 1975, model for more details).
This asumption could be justified if it is hypothesized that the
suppositional nature of syntactic negation varies as a function of the
presence or absence of a semantically negative counterpart to it. Namely,
granted that a distinction can be drawn in sentences with semantically
negative implicative predicates between those that have a semantically
positive counterpart (SEM-NEGp), as in the case of forget, and those that
do not have a positive counterpart (SEM-NEGn), as in the case of neglect,
it can be said that SYN-NEG sentences are represented in terms of three
embedded propositions, that is, as (false(AFF(.........))) in the presence
of a SEM-NEGp sentence and in terms of two embedded propositions, that is,
as (false(........)) in the absence of a SEM-NEGp sentence. This
hypothesis could be investigated empirically. Further study of semantic
negation is required to determine the generality of this finding.
Context Effects
It was predicted that all context conditions would decrease inference
latencies for all sentence types. This prediction was based on the
assumption that the inferential process would be facilitated when occurring
in a context that met some of the presuppositions of the sentences. All
context conditions met some of the general presuppositions of all sentences
by positing the existence of the object denoted by the complement noun of
the implicative verb. The main effect of context and the appropriate
pairwise comparisons confirmed this prediction, indicating that contexts
meeting the presuppositions of sentences facilitate not only comprehension
but also reasoning.
The decrease in inference latencies for all sentence types under the
context conditions in this study is consistent with previous findings that
comprehension time for sentences with a definite noun phrase presupposing
existence is shorter when these sentences are preceded by a context
sentence positing the existence of the referent of the definite noun
(Haviland & Clark, 1974; Juppet & Le Bouedec, 1977). Haviland and Clark
have discussed this finding in the context of a broader theory of language
comprehension known as the "given-new contract" theory. The present study
extends those findings by showing that the given-new contract theory
applies also to an inference-drawing task.
A second context effect that applies equally to remember/forget and to
bother/neglect is the finding that all context conditions affected semantic
negation time more than syntactic negation time. More specifically, both
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in the case of bother/neglect and in the case of remember/forget syntactic
negation time (the difference of AFF from SYN-NEG sentences) was not
affected by context, while semantic negation time (the differences of AFF
from SEM-NEG sentences) decreased significantly under the context
conditions. The latter effect resulted in a statistically reliable
interaction between context and semantic negation.
The context X semantic positiveness/negativeness interaction is
consistent with the more general finding that semantic negation is more
sensitive to the meaning fluctuations of the different sentence types than
syntactic negation. Namely, semantic negation (but not syntactic negation)
entered into statistically significant interactions in addition to context,
with complement type and implicative verb type.
These results indicate that there is a real psychological difference
between syntactic negation and semantic negation in the way these two types
of negation are processed during language comprehension and reasoning.
While both SYN-NEG and SEM-NEG sentences require the performance of
additional operations, in comparison to affirmative sentences, these
operations are affected more by meaning variation in the case of semantic
negation than in the case of syntactic negation. This holds equally well
for SEM-NEGp and SEM-NEGn sentences.
With regard to the differential effects of context on sentences with
remember/forget and bother/neglect, there are mainly two results that need
to be accounted for. First, syntactic negation time was much shorter in
the case of not bother than in the case of not remember under all context
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conditions. This finding also holds for the no-context condition and was
discussed in the previous section. As such, this difference will not be
further discussed here. The second difference was that the semantically
negative context (the bad context) further facilitated the processing of
sentences with neglect but not sentences with forget. This finding adds
further support to the suggestion that forget loses some of its semantic
negative identity and is treated as a negation of remember, whereas neglect
is treated independently of bother. It is interesting to note that
inference latencies for sentences with neglect and bother are almost equal
under the bad-context condition, despite the greater complexity of the
inference-drawing task in the negative situation. This result agrees with
Wason's (1965) argument that the difficulty in the processing of
affirmative/positive and negative sentences decreases when the negative
sentences are presented in contexts which meet their presuppositions.
Summary
The results of the present study indicate that overall, differences in
the presuppositions of implicative predicates affect the process of drawing
their implications. Sentences with implicative predicates that involved
semantic negation had inference latencies different from those of sentences
involving syntactic negation, despite the fact that all sentences implied
the falsity of the proposition contained in their complements. With
respect to semantic negation, it was found that semantically negative
implicative predicates cannot be characterized in a general way but that
there are important differences among them, such as the presence or absence
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of positive counterparts, which influence their representation and
processing. In addition, the results of the context manipulations show
that a linguistic context meeting the presuppositions of implicative
sentences can facilitate the process of drawing the implications of these
sentences. Inference latencies for implicative sentences were lower when
these sentences were presented in contexts that met some of their general
presuppositions than when these sentences were presented in contexts that
did not. Context also facilitated the processing of semantically negative
implicative sentences more than the processing of syntactically negative
ones, indicating that a real psychological difference exists in the way
these two types of negation are processed in language comprehension and
reasoning tasks.
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Table 1
Exemplar Sentences with Implicative Predicates
Syntactically
Semantically
Affirmative Negative
Positive Fred has remembered to Fred hasn't remembered
open the safe (AFF)a to open the safe (SYN-NEG)b
Negative Fred has forgotten to Fred hasn't forgotten
open the safe (SEM-NEG)b to open the safe (SEM/SYN-NEG)a
Implies the truth of the proposition contained in its complement
(i.e., Fred opened the safe: true)
bImplies the falsity of the proposition contained in its complement
(i.e., Fred opened the safe: false)
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Table 2
Mean Inference Latencies
for the Main Effect of Context
Mean Latencies
Context (in msec)
No context 1213
Unbiased context 959
Bad context 933
Good context 918
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-Figure Captions
Figure 1. Mean inference latencies as a function of implicative
verb type, syntactic affirmation/negation, and semantic positiveness/
negativeness.
Figure 2. Mean inference latencies for the two implicative verb
types as a function of context, syntactic affirmation/negation, and
semantic positiveness/negativeness.
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